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ABSTRACT 
Research is undenvay throughout the world into alternative approaches to water allocation that can 
maximise economic efficiency while respecting environmental bottom lines and ensuring the rule of 
law. One innovative programme, led by researchers at the University of Canterbury, is examining the 
potential for a spot market for water. Building on the successful implementation of a spot market for 
electricity in New Zealand, the approach would accept bids for the purchase or sale of water, and then 
find the water allocations that optimise the economic benefit to society. 
The approach uses a number of constraints on optimisation reflecting the physical limits to water 
availability, and also reflecting environmental objectives. The latter can include a minimum stream 
flow constraint and a maximum drawdown constraint to limit seawater intrusion. Unlike other water 
trading approaches, this approach does not require negotiating and evaluating a series of transfers 
between pairs of users; instead, the approach can consider all water users and their unique needs 
simultaneously, while ensuring environmental compatibility. The research is advancing along three 
lines: (1) investigation of the level of model sensitivity and its effects on the operation of the market, 
(2) study of the potential methods of operation of the model (e.g., 'user-pays', 'user-trades', user co- 
operative), and (3) consultation with interest groups to identify practical concerns. 
THE NEW ZEALAND SETTING 
Water allocation in New Zealand has moved to the front pages of newspapers, and has become an issue 
of national significance. In more and more of the country, water is judged to be 'fully allocated' or will 
soon be judged so. Some users need more water, while other users have not used all their consent. The 
current consent system is expensive to operate, is perceived by users and the community as being a 
risky way to ensure supply or environmental protection, and is slow to adapt to new supply data or 
changes in user demand. 
The Water Programme of Action (WPoA) was established in 2003 as a joint effort of the Ministries for 
the Environment and Agriculture and Forestry to examine freshwater management in recognition of the 
urgency for action by the country as a whole to what had been perceived as unrelated local issues. The 
WPoA has recommended a set of actions (MfE, 2004) including: 
Collaboration between central and local government, scientists and stakeholders regional councils 
and scientists on pilot projects to demonstrate and test new water management initiatives (Action 13). 
Enhancement of transfer of allocated water between users (Actions 7 and 11). 
In general terns, central government in New Zealand recognizes that better market systems are needed 
to enhance the transferability of water permits, and offer financial incentives for improving the 
efficiency of water use. On the other hand, trials or research into water market systems has been very 
limited. 
THE GLOBAL SETTING 
The world is faced with a water crisis as demand grows without an increase in supply. The type of 
water crisis we face is open to debate: 
'There is a perception of water shortage, especially during drought periods. But this perception is 
largely the result of existing institutions for water management, institutions that were designed in an 
era of abundance. One matter is clear - water users respond to incentives, and when water becomes 
more expensive, they conserve and use it more efficiently without much effect on overall welfare. I 
argue, therefore, that we do not have so much a water scarcity crisis as we do a water management 
crisis.' - David Zilbeman (1994) 
Our research is into better water management processes, and follows from the recognition that the price 
paid by water users almost everywhere in the world is less than the true marginal cost to society of 
additional water use, and hence is underpriced. Some pricing mechanism is desperately needed (Dinar 
& Subramanian 1997). True marginal cost prices maximize what is called the 'consumer surplus,' 
which is the sum of the differences, over all consumers, between each user's value and the price they 
pay. Marginal cost prices would signal users where and when to use water, where to install 
augmentation (e.g., dams), and how much to pay for it. Political pressure to fund new dams or restrict 
new water use would be easier to resolve if accurate signals, in the form of the prices of water, were 
available to all. 
Price signals can also make environmental protection more effective. Current allocation systems are 
prone to criticism from those who want more and iess water use. Those who want more water use 
believe that environmental protection is too tight in too many places, and that little regard is made for 
the economic impact of increased environmental protection. Those who want less water use believe 
that approval for water use is allowed because of economic benefits to a select few without full study of 
the potential environmental impact. The result of this impasse is not investigation of the optimum 
system that best meets both economic and environmental needs, but instead is a political 'winner-take- 
all' approach by both sides. The introduction of prices into the current stand-off would allow for 
discussion of the relative benefits and costs of increased or decreased water use in various places within 
a catchment. An allocation system that provides price signals while also reducing power struggles over 
water is desperately needed. 
Economists and international leaders have stated for years that fresh water should be managed through 
markets, with the caveat that such markets must be designed correctly. However, no one has described 
how to set up a water market that accounts for users' effects on each other and on the environment. 
Many previous market approaches have not been able to have the price reflect the true marginal cost of 
additional water use. Water trading experiments (such as in Chile and parts of Australia) have received 
criticism due to errors of market design. 
The hydrology makes trading complicated because each user affects every other user. Matching buy 
and sell orders cannot be done pair-wise, because any pair-wise trade would affect other users and the 
environment. Instead of a trading system, our research focuses on a spot market system where a user 
buys from (or sells to) everyone else at once. To find the best allocations in a spot market, the market 
manager requires a computer system with a hydrology simulation and an optimization procedure. 
Most water use is by relatively large and sophisticated concerns (e.g., agricultural businesses, 
electricity generators, local government). Much of the contention in water allocation is between these 
large users. By relieving the constraints of fixed allocations between large users, acrimonious legal 
debate can give way to flexible market activity. Any successful market system must allow for new 
high-value uses of water to replace existing low-value uses, while compensating the existing users. 
METHODOLOGY 
The system under development has three parts: (1) an interface for users' bids, (2) a hydrological 
response model, (3) constraints on water use, and (3) and an optimization model to determine prices 
and allocate water. 
Inter$ace for users' bids 
Users would be expected to give their marginal dernand/price curves in the forrns of a series of reserve 
values for water. Users would give a high value for the first amount of water they receive and lower 
values for additional water. An example of a user bid page is shown in Figure 1. In the example, the 
user (WellOl) has had their allocation reduced from 1 unit of water to 0.17 units of water because of a 
severe drought. The user has decided to try to buy 0.3 units of water if it can be bought for $2/unit or 
less, to buy an additional 0.3 units of water if the price is $1.5/unit or less, and to buy a further 0.3 if 
the price i S $ I .  Ohnit. On the other hand, the user also understands that water could be very valuable 
and it might have a higher value to other users and so is willing to sell 0.08 of the 0.17 units of water 
available if the price is $2.5/unit or more, and willing to sell a further 0.08 (leaving only 0.01) for 
S3Iunit. If the market value of water at this user's well turns out to be between $2 and $2.5, the user 
would neither buy nor sell water. Notice that the user is not compelled to buy or sell. Furthermore, the 
user might pay less than the offered buy price, or may sell at higher than the minimum sell price. 
To bid sensibly, users will need some idea of what the market price for water will be, and tentative 
auctions can be held to assess likely value. Users would also want to have access to information on past 
bidding rounds and even meteorological forecasts. 
Improvements in internet commerce and the familiarity of many people with internet bidding systems 
(e.g., TradeMe), implies that an online market for water is more feasible than it would have been years 
ago, when traders would have needed to be present in the same room for an auction. 
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Figure 1 : Sample user bid page 
Hydrologicul response model 
In the proposed water trading system, there exists capacity limits on the amount of water that can be 
delivered to a user or that can be made available for sale. In other words, some users are more 
hydrologically connected than others, and additional water use in one part of the system can have a 
different effect on each user elsewhere in the system. To assess the optimum water use, we need to 
know the marginal effect of each abstraction on every other user. These marginal effects can be found 
for groundwater users using the program MODMAN (Greenwald, 1998). MODMAN takes a standard 
MODFLOW model of a catchment and finds the effect of a unit of water use on the water availability 
(as measured by head) for every other user. Thls information is provided as a response matrix. 
This response matrix approach was developed to find out how much water should be pumped from 
each of a series of wells being used to control the migration of groundwater contaminants; it works by 
varying the flow in each well to optimise (minimise in this case) the total amount of pumping. By the 
principle of superposition, overall impact at one well can be estimated as the sum of the effects of 
pumping from the other wells. When the assumption of superposition appears unreasonable, a new 
response matrix can be developed to represent the changing circumstances. For a water market, the 
software is modified to vary the flow in each well to optimise (maximise in this case) the consumer 
surplus. When the assumption of superposition appears unreasonable, a new response matrix can be 
developed to represent the changing circumstances. 
Constraints on water use 
The optimization of consumer surplus requires the careful input of proper constraints on water use. 
Examples are water pressure difference constraints to ensure water flow into streams, water elevation 
minima to ensure no long-term exploitation of the resource, and water elevation minima to limit sea 
water intrusion, or catchment-wide maximum water use to meet sustainable water yield goals. Physical 
constraints might also be required, such as the total flow capacity of an irrigation canal. 
The values chosen for the constraints are the result of social consultation and are typically found in 
catchment management plans. They have often already been translated into an appropriate form for a 
computer model to allow water resource planners to evaluate the potential effect of water allocations. 
Rather than being used only for occasional assessments of the water that can be allocated in a 
catchment, these constraints are used operationally in the market system every time an auction is held. 
In this way, the market system would provide at least as good environmental protection as is currently 
available. 
Gplimisation model to deteumi~e prices mid allocate water 
The optimization uses a common technique of operations research known as linear programming. The 
variables are the water flows for each user, the constraints are as described above, the user inputs are 
the bids, and the model optimizes consumer surplus. The result of the optimization is not only the water 
flow for each user, but also the marginal value of additional water at every location of interest. The 
price can be found even at places where there is no water user, say at a river. The price at a given 
location is calculated as the cost to everyone else if that user were to take one more unit of water, 
which is the marginal cost. Users are then charged (or paid) for their purchase (or sale) at their local 
price. 
The size of the linear program depends on the number of wells required, the number of environmental 
control points, and the number of time periods. The linear program can be solved easily in a few 
seconds with open source software. Even for complex real-world hydrological systems, the linear 
program would be of a modest size by typical operations research standards. 
SAMPLE RESULTS 
Two sets of sample results are presented: one with hypothetical hydrogeology and another with realistic 
features. The first one is for a small catchment that only receives water from rainfall, and only has 18 
water users, all with 1 unit of water allocation under normal conditions. The catchment is shown in 
plan view in Figure 2. A drought means that all water users have had their allocation reduced to 0.17 
units of water. All users are assumed to have the same demandprice curve with users willing to sell 
down to 0.05 units of water only if the price is $4 or more, while users are willing to buy water to reach 
0.4 units if the price is $3 or less, and willing to buy water to reach their pre-drought allocation of 1.0 
units if the price is $2 or less, and willing to buy excess water if available to 6.0 units if the prices is $1 
or less. The results are shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Price map for hypothetical scenario where all initial allocations are reduced from 1 to 0.17 
units, and then users are allowed to buy and sell. At the left is the sea, a stream runs through the middle 
of the area, the other boundaries do not allow flow, and the black lines are the contour lines h r  water 
pressure prior to the auction. The numbers shown are: user name, local water price per unit, purchase 
(+) or sale (-) of water units, and total allocation of water units after purchaseisale. 
Notice first that trades do occur even though all users have the same value for water. This is because 
the environmental constraints on water mean that water is more expensive near environmentally 
sensitive locations, and users close to locations where the constraint is more severe pay more. For 
example, in Figure 2, the value of water for Well 12 is $4, while the value of water for Well 15 is only 
$1. T h s  is because a seawater incursion constraint is active near Well 12 and Well 12 is not able to 
harvest much rainfall because of the nearness to the southern boundary of the catchment. 
This may strike some as being inequitable, but consider that it sends a clear signal that only the most 
socially productive uses of water should be considered in locations where large environmental impacts 
are more likely, thereby shifting more consumptive water use to locations where water use would cause 
less harm (in this case, further away from the coast and the stream). In this example, the high price at 
We1112 has led this user to sell water. The willingness of Well 12 to sell has allowed the neighbours to 
use more water than they otherwise would in a drought, but required a monetary transfer from the 
neighbours to Well 12 as compensation. All users have traded, all users have benefited from trading, 
and the environmental bottom lines have been respected. 
The first example is simplified because it does not consider a suitably complex hydrogeology or the 
many more users existing in real world catchments. The second example considers the Wairau River 
catchment and the city of Blenheim in the Marlborough District of the South Island of New Zealand. 
The catchment is 21 by 26 km and there is an existing MODFLOW representation for the groundwater 
in the catchment, including a sophisticated connection between surface and groundwater. 
Environmental constraints have already been identified and expressed in model terns. For this study, 
we fixed the flow to the 265 smallest water users, and only considered that the 623 largest water users 
were allowed to participate in the market. The largest water user is the City of Blenheim with a use of 
1.3 ~ m ~ l d a y .  
We did not have data on actual water use, and instead used the allocated water for each user as a 
starting point. We also did not have data for the value of water to various users, so we assumed 
identical bids for all users, based on proportional changes in allocations: a user would sell all water 
allocated at $l/m3, sell 83% of the water at 0.8 and sell 50% of the water at 0.6, buy 50% more water at 
$0.4/rn3, and buy 75% more at $0.2/m3. The results are shown in Figure 3. 
are 
In Figure 3, water buyers are at those wells with prices less than 0.4, and water sellers are at those wells 
with prices greater than 0.6, and users sell all water where the price is greater than 1. The only binding 
environmental constraint is at point B3, and to meet this constraint, water prices are high near it, 
especially upstream (to the left) of B3. 
Water cost decreases the further away users are horn this critical point, until water has no cost where 
constraints are not close and even a '75% increase in water use would not lead to constraints being 
reached. These 'no-cost' results are partly an artifice of the assumed water priceidemand curves. 
These results show that if users near B3 were willing to sell, water use could be shifted elsewhere in the 
catchment without damaging the environment. The results also show a relatively high cost of water for 
the City of Blenheim. This in turn indicates how one could estimate the social cost associated with 
expansion of the city's water supply and ensure that an equivalent social benefit arises from that 
additional water use. 
The results from the second example demonstrate that the system is technically viable, and the results 
also demonstrate the potential for valuable analysis even in cases where the system is not used in an 
active water market. 
MODEL REFINEMENTS 
Model sensitivity is one of three focal points for development work on the technology. We hope to 
examine the level of model detail necessary for the operation of a market. Existing models used by 
regional councils in water assessment may be overly detailed and could be simplified for use in water 
auctions. In adcbtion, there is a desire to study the effects of water use by nearby wells, how models can 
describe short-term effects, and how auctions need to be constrained to limit unfairness or gaming 
between nearby users. 
Another important refinement is the development of more realistic priceidemand curves. Currently, we 
are not sure what suitable curves are, nor how prices might vary with variations in these curves. We 
hope to construct hypothetical scenarios with constrained hydrology to examine the effect of varying 
user demand curves on prices. For example, one would expect that the water resource would be more 
efficiently used by creating a mosaic of water users with inelastic water-pricing users far away from 
environmental constraints interspersed with elastic water users closer to environmental constraints. The 
long-term implications on land use based of a water market are worthy of further examination, but the 
hypothesis is that a spot market for ground water would lead to heterogeneity of land use in a given 
catchment. 
It could also be that slight changes in specific hydrological parameters could lead to large differences in 
;. - water price, which could tead to disputes over the appropriate constants used in the hydrological model. 
With more realistic priceidemand curves, we intend to examine the issue of model sensitivity more 
closely. It is clear that water prices will also provide a signal to indicate where refinements in the 
hydrological model are most needed. Specifically, there is interest in studying the ability to model the 
effects of water use by nearby wells, and the effect of parameter uncertainty on trading decisions. 
We aim to study the degree to which the response matrix is sufficiently accurate for market purposes. 
The time required to obtain the response matrix depends on the size and complexity of the hydrological 
model, and the number of wells. With the Marlborough example, we found that this can require several 
hours of computing time, even on a quad parallel processor. 
Many key users, especially hydroelectric generators, are concerned that surface water and reservoirs be 
included in the market system. In fact, these features are easily managed through standard MODFLOW 
packages. Examples of optimisation for combined surface and ground water appear in the literature 
(e.g. Pulido et a1 2002). The difficult part of implementing this system does not appear to be the 
addition of surface water, although we have not yet run realistic trials including surface water. 
METHODS OF OPERATION 
Various options for operation of the model are under investigation. The model itself is a general tool 
that can be adopted for multiple uses, including: 
0 a pure 'user-pays ' regime where all water is purchased from a central organization and there is no 
right to water, 
0 a 'government-protection' regime where water users are compensated by government when water 
restrictions are needed to meet environmental objectives, and 
0 a 'user-trades' regime where water restrictions are not allowed to lead to payment to or from a central 
body, but instead lead to reductions in allocations before trades. 
We have found that the market allocation of water is the same, independent of the initial allocation. 
Instead of changes in the final allocation, what changes is whether the auction manager has a net 
receipt or payment of money. Currently, we are examining the use of proportional reductions in water 
allocations to all users to ensure a 'user-trades' regime where the auction manager is revenue neutral. 
The use of proportional reductions means that only one variable needs to be adjusted to ensure that the 
water market remains revenue-neutral. Initial allocations can be set by other methods and we also 
would like to explore the use of 'classes' of water permits where certain users have complete priority 
over other users, as in the prior appropriation doctrine in parts of the U.S. 
In addition, options are being explored for operation of the market by either an existing regulatory 
agency, a new quasi-governmental organization, or by a co-operative of water users who amalgamate 
their water use consents. The last option is intriguing because it points to the possibility of water users 
choosing to institute a water market even without the need for government to drive regulatory or 
legislative change. If the market can work in a revenue-neutral form for all water users, there would 
appear to be a win-win situation for water users and regulatory agencies to move towards a user- 
operated water market. The advantage for the regulatory agency would be the reduction in the number 
of water consents and the ability to provide clearer oversight by working with water professionals (i.e., 
the water market manager) rather than a number of less hydrologically trained water users. 
There is also interest in exploring the potential for the use of 'futures' markets for water under this 
market model which merits investigation. 
CONSULTATION 
Changes in water allocation policy affect many individuals and interest groups. An integral part of our 
research effort is outreach and listening to public issues. It is encouraging that there has been interest in 
this research programme from regulatory bodies, irrigation groups, hydropower entities, and water 
protection interest groups. 
In December of 2005, the New Zealand Hydrological Society sponsored a workshop in Auckland 
examining water trading. A wide variety of backgrounds were represented in the 34 participants. One 
interesting outcome from the workshop was the realisation that, in New Zealand, an open water market 
would require a decoupling of water quantity issues from other issues that are currently related to 
receipt and review of a water consent. Because the government in New Zealand owns the water and 
because the Resource Management Act recognises the potential for trading in S. 136, a water market is 
not as difficult to implement here as elsewhere. However, S. 136 appears to envision one-to-one 
transfer of water rather than a spot market as discussed here. To allow a spot market, regulatory 
authorities would need to change their Regional Plans modestly. Use of water purchased in a market 
could be considered a permitted activity, while the use of sold water would then need to be a prohibited 
activity. Our list of identified research needs includes further analysis of the RMA implications and 
effects on property rights. 
Another important point raised at the workshop was the need for monitoring of compliance in any 
water trading system. The spot market discussed here would require that all users have water flow 
meters with data sent to the market manager. Still, there must be a simpler way to control water use 
than the public prosecution system now in use by local government for regulatory breaches. 
The concerns regarding regulatory breaches and changes in Regional Plans apply when a market is 
operated by the current regulatory agency. It will be interesting to examine this fiu-ther if water user co- 
operatives are considered further as the organisation of choice for the market manager. 
We have found great value in workshop demonstrations of the software in action with a simplified 
catchment. The workshop allows individuals to see the impact of different bidding strategies on prices, 
and also see how prices can vary based on environmental constraints even with similar bids. With the 
increasing use of internet auction sites in New Zealand, we find that workshop participants very 
quickly can bid for water successfully. 
We have found a challenge in having organisations take the step fiom expressing interest to becoming 
more involved in a trial implementation. Our perception is that the highly-charged political atmosphere 
related to water allocation makes it difficult for individual organisations to push for change to a more 
market-based approach without appearing to be lobbying for changes that will benefit them to the 
detriment of others. Curiously, currently competing interests will each recognise the need for markets 
privately, but not publicly. We find that interest is greater from larger organisations and from 
catchments where water quantity is more constrained. In addition, we are limited by the lack of 
financial resources to advance the research programme and will continue to consult with potential 
beneficiaries regarding financial contributions. 
We are currently asking for letters of interest from organisations and will provide these interested 
organisations with newsletter updates on research and hope to build from that group of most-interested 
organisations towards a trial implementation. We welcome letters of interest and are willing to run 
workshops around the country or world as requested. 
COSTS AND RISKS 
As mentioned above, implementation of this system would require metering water use. A meter costs 
several thousand dollars, but councils are increasingly requiring metering, especially for larger users. 
Implementation would require the use of sophisticated hydrological models; however, the same models 
are required to manage the current water allocation system. 
We see risks in operation of the system. Government could neglect rule enforcement (allowing 
cheating), or may neglect maintenance of the hydrology models. This system requires the rule of law, 
and would work best in a democratic society. Further, as demand for water increases, and as water 
moves to its highest value, we see the price of water increasing, though much more so without trading. 
Society may blame trading itself for the high price of water, rather than society's own demand for 
water. 
BENEFITS OF IMPLEMENTATION 
NZ's value for fresh water - local authority reticulation networks, irrigation, and hydroelectric 
generation - is estimated at $1.4 billiodyear (StatisticsNZ 2004). Gains from optimisation in business 
(e.g. airlines and hydroelectric planning) are often 10% to 15%, so optimising the water resource could 
gain $140-220 milliodyear, through movement of water from lower to higher value use. Adoption of a 
water market holds the prospect of a measurable gain to national GDP. 
In addition, a spot market developed in the way described would lead to more reliable attainment of 
environmental 'bottom lines', clear and correct price signals for water where before there were no 
prices signals, and fewer appeals and court cases associated with water consent applications. The 
hydrology simulation and optimisation guarantee the sustainability of any quantity. Thus, contention 
for consents is greatly reduced. Councils need no longer be the bearer of bad news by denying water 
permits. Instead, councils can focus on the environment. 
In this system, users have no need to spend time seeking or advertising for water trades, because the 
central auction design matches buyers and sellers directly. Users do not need to make sure that the 
regional council will be satisfied, because the optimization enforces environmental flows 
automatically. Thus, the transaction costs are very low. 
The system we are developing is not privatisation. In the system, the administrative permission to use 
water is traded. Our focus is mainly on larger water users. Our aim is to permanently solve NZ's key 
water allocation problems, while improving NZ' S wealth and environment. 
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